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SAHARA: POSSIBILITIES FOR COORDINATION OF AID(U) ARMY
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
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STUDENT ESSAY

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ARAB AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA
POSSIBILITIES FOR COORDINATION OF AID

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL NORMAN E. YOUNGBLOOD III, MI

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

ARAB AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA
POSSIBILITIES FOR COORDINATION OF AID

by

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7 April 1986



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ABSTRACT


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Africa South of the Sahara is an area of the world which has a great need for both economic and security assistance. It is also an area of interest for both the United States and pro-Western Arab nations. In an era when both the United States and Arabs are faced with reduced abilities to provide this assistance, it is imperative that they work together whenever possible to maximize their contributions. Examination of stated national goals and objectives in the region, as well as those actual interests reflected in the aid actually provided, reveals that United States and Arab interests often coincide and are seldom in conflict. This is especially true in Somalia and Sudan, which are key to both the Arabs and the United States. These two nations will undoubtedly continue to receive the majority of aid in the region and represent areas where the Arabs and the United States can work hand in glove for maximum benefit. In other areas, the Arabs can take the lead in coordinating aid to other Arab and Muslim African nations, The United States will then be free to concentrate on other key nations such as Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Zaire.



ARAB AND AMERICAN INTEREST IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

In recent years, Africa South of the Sahara has been much in the news, both as a result of the devastating drought and famine, as characterized by the conditions in Ethiopia, and because of the growing unrest in South Africa. Yet while Africa may be of only recent and possibly passing interest to the general American public, the continent has always been of interest to both Europe and the Arabs. This has been because of its enormous mineral wealth, its vast population resources and its strategic location.

The United States has a growing interest in Africa now, because of its location astride routes to Southwest Asia and its strategic minerals. Thus, in recent years, the United States has sought to expand its influence in the area through economic and military assistance programs. However, the aid needs of this region are enormous and the resources of even the United States are finite. With the enactment of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, the US contribution will undoubtedly decrease.

It is imperative, therefore, that the United States seek common cause with other nations, both to aid the Africans and to achieve our national objectives in the area. Since our policies are already generally coordinated with our European and Japanese friends, it is worthwhile to try to find a common ground with pro-Western Arab nations.

The large increases in oil prices, starting in 1973 provided the oil-producing nations with unprecedented wealth, which continues, even with the current price decreases. As a result, the principal Arab recipients of this wealth have become major sources of financial

assistance to developing nations. In fact, during 1976 and 1977, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the second largest donor of official development assistance in the world, after the United States.¹ In order to find some common ground for coordinating US and Arab aid programs in Africa South of the Sahara, it is first necessary to look briefly at why the Arabs are interested in Africa and what their aid programs seek to accomplish.

Arab interests in Africa South of the Sahara are colored to a great extent by history. The Arabs have been involved in Africa in one way or another since the beginning of recorded history, especially Egypt. Egypt has a long tradition of activity in Africa, in the political, cultural, religious and economic areas. These activities go back to the predynastic period and have resulted in long-lasting Egyptian social, cultural and political influence in Nubia, now northern Sudan and in Central Africa. By dominating Nubia, Egypt controlled key caravan routes and the vital headwaters of the Nile river. By the 14th century, Egyptian influence was strong as far south as Uganda and as far west as Ghana and Mali.² (See map at Appendix 1).

Egyptian interest and influence in Africa rose and fell with the fortunes of the nation itself, but with the withdrawal of the colonial powers from sub-Saharan Africa and the rise of Nasser, Egypt became very active in the region once again. Under Nasser, Egypt provided support to African nationalist movements and aid to the newly independent nations of the area.

Other Arab nations have had less direct contact with Africa South of the Sahara, except with regard to trade along the East Coast and in support of the expansion of Islam. Indeed, the expansion of Islam into

Africa by Arabs was a major factor in African development from the 7th century onward, making inroads in the West as far south as Ghana and in the East, all along the coast. (See map at appendix 2.)

Oman has a long tradition of involvement in Africa. In the 15th century, Oman began to help the East African Muslims to evict the Portuguese and by 1650, most of the coast was clearly Arab. Soon, an Omani empire was established. At its high point, this empire, with its capital on Zanzibar, dominated the East Coast from Somalia to Mozambique,³ firmly implanting both Arab culture and Islam. When the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, Europeans became more involved in Egyptian and East African affairs and Arab power in Africa South of the Sahara began to wane, yet Islam remained.

In examining current Arab interests in Africa South of the Sahara, authors have identified five factors which tend to draw the two regions together, in addition to the historical ties just mentioned.⁴ The first of these is geographic proximity. The only land area contiguous to sub-Saharan Africa is that occupied by the Arabs and loosely referred to as the Middle East. Additionally, trade by sea has always been relatively easy along the East Coast, as evidenced by the Omani Empire.

Second, there is a shared Islamic faith, a faith which penetrates deep into Africa, as we have seen. Islam is a strongly held faith, and one which stresses the unity of the faithful. In this current period of expanding Islamic fundamentalism and resurgence, this faith is a significant factor and one which heavily influences Arab aid. This is especially true of Saudi Arabia, which feels a special obligation as the birthplace of Islam.

A third major factor is a common economic dependence on exports of primary products and an interest in a "New Economic Order." Fourth, there is an perceived shared hostility toward Israel and the current regime in South Africa and fifth, the nations of the two regions are said to share Third World ideals, such as "Anti-colonialism," "Non-Alignment," and "Anti-Imperialism." Despite the above, Arab aid does not always match these so-called common interests, as we shall see.

If we look at Arab aid to Africa South of the Sahara in recent years, it can be roughly divided into that provided by Libya, by Egypt, and by the pro-western Arab states of the Persian Gulf. It is the aid and the potential contributions of the latter two categories which we shall examine.

First, Egypt. After Nasser's death, the Egyptian government began to place most of its emphasis on the use of the political instruments of power rather than ideology and military assistance. Of course, this coincided with the independence of almost all of Africa. Since the peace treaty with Israel, there has been an expanded use of diplomatic, cultural, religious, and technical assistance.

Indeed, although Egypt has little, if any, money to spare for aid, some authors believe that Egyptian influence is on the rise in the region.⁵ Egyptian exports to Africa are expanding rapidly. Egyptian anti-imperialist credentials are good, and she may be able to improve her economic position in Africa without arousing fears of neo-colonialism. In the educational area, El Azhar University in Cairo has historically trained many thousands of African Muslim scholars as well as providing highly qualified graduates in many fields. Egyptian

interests in Africa remain essentially the same as they have been throughout history: A desire to control the sources of the Nile and the need for economic expansion.⁶

Although since 1973 the pro-western Arab nations of the Arabian Gulf have provided large amounts of financial aid to many nations around the world, with the largest total going to Asia, Africa South of the Sahara is clearly the area of primary interest outside of the Middle East when viewed on a per capita basis. In addition, Africa is the only non-Arab region to have had Arab multilateral organizations established to coordinate aid to the area and sponsor large projects.

Assistance by the Gulf states has been purely financial in nature, because they have nothing else with which they can really influence other nations. Arab financial aid can be divided into two categories: Bilateral assistance and multilateral institutional aid. Bilateral aid, that between governments, national development funds and financial institutions, has constituted more than 85 percent of total Arab annual commitments since 1973. This trend has continued even with the establishment of the specialized Arab financial institutions for the administration of aid to the region.

Bilateral aid is preferred because such aid is a key element of foreign policy. Bilateral aid is highly visible and can be tightly controlled by the donor nation.⁷ It also requires direct coordination between governments, thus increasing the donor's influence on the recipient.

With this in mind, it is important to remember that aid provided by any nation is primarily motivated by national interests. Certainly,

this is as true for the Arab nations of the Gulf as it is for any other nation.

Overall, Arab national interests in Africa South of the Sahara can be classified into four general categories: Political, economic, humanitarian and religious. Naturally, these may be combined, but an analysis of bilateral aid programs reveals that political interests are generally the most important when it comes to the distribution of aid.

There are four political interests which seem to be common to the Gulf states. The first is the enhancement of the donor country's national security, its political and economic influence and its power. Secondly, the preservation of regional political stability. Thirdly, to achieve the diplomatic isolation of Israel by winning support for the Arab position on Palestine. Finally, to demonstrate "solidarity" with other Third World nations on issues such as "Non-alignment," "North-South dialogue," "New Economic Order," and "Anti-Colonialism," as mentioned before.⁸

Economically, the Arabs have also had four general goals. Until the recent price drop, they wanted to achieve acceptance of continued oil price increases. Now, they most certainly want to achieve acceptance of future increases. Acceptance of price increases was a task which proved very difficult to achieve among the non-oil producing African nations, whose already fragile economies were very hard hit by the rapid escalation of prices. Tied to this desired acceptance of oil price increases is a desire on the part of the Arabs to gain support for the formation of primary commodity cartels, as exemplified by the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the cartels' legitimate control over commodity prices. Thirdly, the Arabs provide

aid to improve their ability to influence the policies of key African producers of oil, alternative energy sources and strategic raw materials. In addition, they would like to acquire ownership of profitable and significant African mineral resources themselves. This latter goal enables the Arabs to diversify their sources of income, but would appear to run a bit contrary to their stated goals of "Anti-Imperialism," since it takes control of resources away from the Africans.⁹

Some Arab nations also appear to be motivated by humanitarian concerns, but generally ones which have important political considerations. Key among these have been highly publicized efforts to ease the adverse social and economic effects of the higher cost of oil in the non-oil producing countries. This has proven to be more talk than effective action, despite some offset payment programs and results have been minimal. Across the board, the Arab nations have primarily contributed aid to help in economic and social development projects, financing schools and major economic projects such as dams and water systems.

A unique motivational aspect of Arab aid, which I touched on before, is that of religion. This appears to be receiving increasing emphasis, especially with regard to Saudi programs. The Arabs have specific objectives aimed at enhancing the political and economic power of the Islamic Bloc of nations. They want to improve the spiritual, social, economic and political status of Muslim communities in Africa. Additionally, they seek to convert as many people as possible to Islam and to reassert Islamic power and pride in the world. In this respect, Africa seems to be viewed as an area of the world with special

historical connections to the Middle East and an ideal area in which to gain converts.¹⁰

As previously mentioned, the vast majority of Arab aid to sub-Saharan Africa has been provided on a bilateral basis, however a number of Arab multilateral institutions have also been established. Four of these are secular: The Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa (SAAFA), The Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to Arab and African Countries (AFTAAAC), the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA), and the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFIC). There are three major religious institutions: The Islamic Development Bank (IDB), The Islamic Solidarity Fund (ISF) and the Muslim World League.

The majority of the aid furnished through these institutions has been aimed at the economic and social development of Islamic countries and the promotion of trade between Islamic nations, with the emphasis on development projects. A bit surprisingly, it is estimated that less than 3 percent of the capital has been dedicated to Islamic educational, cultural, religious or missionary activities. On the other hand, Islam remains an important bond between nations, and between 1976 and 1980 the IDB provided almost twice as much aid (\$265 million) to Sub-Saharan members of the Islamic Conference as did ABEDA (\$146 million). Additionally, the level of Islamic aid has remained fairly consistent and has not been subject to the fluctuations shown on the secular side.¹¹

Over the years, Arab support for most of these multilateral institutions has waned, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which has been Arab disunity. This has been especially true with the increasing radicalization of Libya and the Egyptian peace treaty with

Israel. Added to this, the institutions failed to achieve their purposes when trade failed to develop as expected and when many African nations reestablished diplomatic relations with Israel. Finally, as is so often the case with human endeavors, the establishment of the institutions filled a perceived need and once that was accomplished, people simply lost interest.¹² More than anything, however, Arab nations found they preferred to be in direct control of how their money was being spent.

The distribution of Arab aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has been heavily influenced by two major factors: Political interests and Islam. Those nations tied to Arab countries politically or religiously, received the bulk of assistance. Between, 1973-1980, two-thirds of Arab bilateral aid to Africa went to Arab League members; specifically Sudan, Mauritania, Somalia and Djibouti. Other principal recipients of Arab aid included nations which actively supported the Arab position on Palestine, such as Senegal, Mali, Zaire, Guinea and Uganda (under Idi Amin). This is clearly reflected in the chart at Appendix 4. Those nations who did not support the Arab position on Palestine or who supported rivals such as Libya, were not provided aid, despite their needs. The same applied to Marxist or radical states such as Ethiopia, Angola and others. Interestingly, the Arabs have not sought to strengthen their position against Israel by providing significant assistance to the "confrontation states" facing South Africa, thus losing a way to gain reciprocal support on an important issue.

Once again, the importance of Islam cannot be overemphasized when it comes to how much nations receive in aid from conservative Arab

nations. Sub-Saharan members of the Islamic Conference received 57 percent of all bilateral assistance during the period 1973-1980.

As a result of the above, the greatest concentrations of Arab aid have been to those nations where there is a strong political interest to be served a common bond through Islam,. Additionally, while there are occasional short-term exceptions, continued interest by donor nations seems to exist only where political, religious and Arab cultural interests coincide.

The United States is interested in Africa South of the Sahara for national security, economic, political and humanitarian reasons. In terms of our national security, the United States needs continued access to strategic resources found in Africa, to include both the minerals in Southern Africa and oil from the West Coast. Additionally, it is important to maintain friendly relations with nations adjacent to the vital transportation routes to the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. Not only do these routes carry most of the oil needed by our European allies, they would be critical in case US Forces were committed to combat in the Gulf region.

The United States has significant economic interests in Africa, because Africa is part of the global economic system. American exports to Africa have dropped 50 percent in the last 3 years and American financial institutions are hard hit by the African inability to repay loans as a result of their economic crises.

Politically, the United States needs to have influence with the nations of sub-Saharan Africa, who now make up nearly one-third of the membership of the United Nations. Additionally, we need to have influence there to stem the tide of Communist expansion, promote

stability in the area and foster the development of democratic governments.

In humanitarian terms the United States is vitally interested in helping Africans suffering the effects of famine and civil war.

While Arab interests in Africa South of the Sahara were generally defined in terms of religious, ethnic and political groupings, the United States interests are best examined regionally.

West Africa has a history of widespread poverty and political instability. Although the US presence and aid levels are not high, they are important and considered necessary in order to demonstrate American interest in the area. If the situation in this region continues to deteriorate, United States interests could be seriously damaged. Accordingly, the United States has four major objectives in the area. First, to assist in long-term development and ease the immediate crisis of hunger. Second, to promote regional stability by helping governments to resist external effort at destabilization: and third, to foster continued access to important raw materials (e.g., Nigerian oil and Guinean bauxite). Additionally, the United States seeks to continue access to important ports, airfields and other facilities.¹³

American aid programs in West Africa are primarily bilateral in nature and focus on increasing food production and in assisting vulnerable governments to help themselves through economic policy reforms. US military assistance programs in this area are not large and are designed to help resist outside interference in internal affairs. Appendix 5 provides a breakout of US Fiscal Year 1986 aid requests for Africa.

East Africa contains several nations which are key to American national security interests, notably Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. Accordingly, US economic and security assistance programs are designed to strengthen economic growth, promote domestic stability and improve self-defense capability.

Economically, the United States has provided assistance on a wide front, ranging from direct grants for imports of food and other commodities, to encouragement of economic and fiscal reforms in coordination with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Developmental assistance projects have been emphasized, in order to increase agricultural productivity. Additionally, training has been provided to improve public sector leadership and management.

American security interests in the area center on its strategic location, especially with regard to its proximity to the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia and the sea and air lines of communications necessary to support operations there. In addition, both Somalia and Kenya possess excellent airfields and port facilities. Access to these port facilities supports the continued deployment of US naval forces in the Indian Ocean.¹⁴ While American aid to this region sounds the same as that provided to West Africa, the major differences lie in the quantity of aid provided. As the chart at Appendix 5 shows, Sudan, Kenya and Somalia accounted for one-third of the economic aid and over one-half of the military aid requested for Fiscal Year 1986 by the US Government for Africa.

In Central Africa, American economic objectives are similar to other regions: To assist governments in pursuing effective economic and development policies; to encourage food production; and to provide

emergency food aid when required. In the security assistance arena, US aid programs are designed to assist in the maintenance of political stability and help governments resist Soviet and Libyan efforts at destabilization through providing that assistance necessary for self-defense.

Chad is the most threatened country in this region, both economically and military, because of continued Libyan aggression and other activities. Although France is considered to have the principal role in assisting Chad, the United States provides limited military assistance and emergency economic aid to prevent famine.

Within Central Africa, Zaire is the key nation with regard to support of US interests and makes a major contribution to stability. Zaire has supported the government of Chad in its fight against Libya. It has also re-established relations with Israel, thus supporting the United States position on that critical issue. With its central position on the African continent, Zaire may eventually be the key to Africa. At the present time, it is extremely important to the United States militarily because it provides an air line of communication from the Atlantic to Kenya and on to Southwest Asia. US security assistance to Zaire is designed to improve the combat readiness of its armed forces, especially through the provision of modern equipment and aircraft. Economically, the United States is working with the IMF and the Zairian government to reform the economy and lay the foundations for long-range development.¹⁵

Southern Africa has been an area much in the news of late. The United States has key economic interests in this region, especially with regard to maintaining continued access to strategic minerals.

Militarily, the area is important because of its proximity to the major sea lines of communications to Europe with regard to the flow of oil and to Southwest Asia should US Forces be committed there.

Accordingly, the US objective is to reduce the level of violence, establish a stable base for regional security and to achieve movement of South Africa away from apartheid and toward a more just system based on the consent of all the governed. American policy, therefore, is to work for diplomatic resolutions of conflicts and provide economic developmental assistance where needed. The only nations in this region to receive any substantial amounts of US aid are Mozambique in the economic arena and Botswana in the military assistance field, primarily to upgrade its self-defense abilities.¹⁶

In summary, while the United States tends to look at Africa South of the Sahara in regional terms, aid is provided mostly on a bilateral basis, and essentially where US security interests are the highest. A major difference between the aid policies of the United States and the Arabs is that US humanitarian assistance is provided regardless of the political bias of the government in power. Additionally, the United States is a major contributor to international organizations which provide and administer aid to Africa.

Having looked at the interests and aid activities of both the pro-Western Arab nations and the United States in Africa South of the Sahara, let us now examine where those interests coincide and where, logically, we can have the possibility of coordinating our programs to achieve mutually important objectives.

The first question that must be answered is whether to work primarily through multilateral institutions and organizations or on a

coordinated bilateral basis. It is clear that both the Arabs and Africans greatly prefer bilateral programs, as does the United States. As mentioned before, bilateral aid provides both the donor and recipient of the assistance greater control over how money is going to be spent. This is important in achieving the results desired by all involved and has the most visible impact, whereas aid furnished by international or multilateral institutions is not visibly from the donor nation and may not be spent on what the donor desires. While the use of multilateral institutions is not visibly from the donor nation and may not be spent on what the donor desires. While the use of multilateral institutions may have its advantages in some circumstances, bilateral aid seems the best way under normal conditions.

Bilateral aid necessitates the United States working directly with individual Arab nations to coordinate policies and programs, to avoid conflicts and duplication of efforts and to achieve the maximum positive impact on the assisted nations. In some countries, the United States can take the lead in providing and coordinating assistance, while in others, various Arab nations can take the lead. In a few selected cases, a concerted joint effort will be required and desired by all. In these latter cases, the United States, should try to get Saudi Arabia, normally the principal Arab donor, to coordinate the Arab support.

The Sudan is clearly a key nation to all concerned. Sudan has been the single largest recipient of aid from both the United States and the Arabs in sub-Saharan Africa since the mid-1970's. In this instance, our assistance programs should be coordinated primarily with Saudi Arabia, which has demonstrated by its past aid programs that the Sudan is its primary country of interest. Our programs must also be carefully

coordinated with Egypt, which has a direct historical and geographic interest in the future of Sudan. Clearly, the United States must remain the primary supplier of military aid to the Sudan, since the other countries cannot provide these resources. On the other hand, Egypt can provide great numbers of teachers who can provide technical training and assistance appropriate to the current level of Sudanese development. The Saudis can provide economic advice and assistance directly to Sudan, and could provide funding for the Egyptian efforts. This would need to be provided to the Egyptians through one of the Arab multilateral institutions, since the Saudis will probably not be willing to give the Egyptians any money directly because of the peace treaty with Israel. Certainly Egyptian participation in these assistance programs would be in their national interest because it would increase Egyptian influence in an area vital to their national security. On the humanitarian side, the United States can continue to be the major supplier of foodstuffs and equipment. The Sudan is a key nation to both the Arabs and the United States and one which is in great economic difficulties. It is also under direct military threat from Libya and Ethiopia and has severe internal stability problems. It will take a carefully coordinated effort by all concerned to achieve stability and progress.

Yet another nation that is key to both the Arabs and the United States is Somalia, which has also been a major recipient of economic and military aid, especially since its break from the Soviet Union. Like the Sudan, Somalia is a member of both the Arab League and the Islamic Conference. Its strategic location results in intense interest by many nations, as shown in Appendix 6. The division of efforts and emphasis can be carried out in a fashion similar to that proposed for the Sudan.

The United States will continue to be the provider of security assistance, while the Gulf Arabs, in coordination with the United States would provide economic assistance and project aid. Egypt would provide educational and technical assistance, as it has in the past.¹⁷

These are the only two sub-Saharan nations where the intensity of American and Arab interests seem to mirror one another. In the rest of Africa, the United States should still work with the Arab nations to achieve a harmony of programs, but with the object of letting the party with the major interest take the lead. For example, the Arab nations should "take the lead" in developing aid programs in the rest of the "Arab African" countries and in the countries where Moslems constitute a large minority. These nations include Mauritania, where the Saudis have expended large amounts of aid in the past, as well as in Guinea, Senegal, Uganda, Mali, Chad and others.

This would leave the United States free to concentrate its energy and aid on key nations where the Arabs have indicated little or no interest, such as Kenya, Liberia and Zaire. Of course, our aid to Senegal and Chad, as well as Djibouti needs to be coordinated with France, as it has been in the past. Throughout the rest of Africa, there is little need to try and coordinate our aid programs with the Arabs, because although they contribute, as does the United States, their aid amounts are not of the magnitude as in the northern part of sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the Arabs really have no significant interest in any area other than that with Arab or Muslim connections.

In summary, the national interests of the United States and pro-Western Arab nations in Africa South of the Sahara are often in coincidence, and very seldom in conflict. The only major differences

lie in the degree of interest shown and, in a few instances, in whether a particular African nation has diplomatic relations with Israel. Across the board, both the United States and the Arabs are interested in achieving political stability in the region and in containing Soviet and Libyan adventurism and expansion. To achieve this, Africa needs both economic and military assistance, and a lot of it.

This requirement for vast amounts of aid will be increasingly difficult to provide, both for the Arabs and the United States. In the United States, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act will freeze or, more likely, reduce the funds available to be committed to foreign aid. In the Arab world, not only are oil revenues down as a result of oil price decreases, but support for Lebanon and Iraq have siphoned off large amounts of money which might otherwise be available for aid to Africa. Additionally, all the Gulf States are devoting large amounts of money to upgrade their own armed forces in the face of threats from Iran. The overall decrease in Arab aid to African in recent years reflects these factors.

Thus, we can expect a severe retrenchment on both sides from past expenditure levels and makes it absolutely imperative to coordinate our aid programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, in order to help the Africans themselves and to achieve our national objectives. This is feasible and clearly in the national interests of all involved.

ENDNOTES

1. Robert A. Mertz and Pamela McD. Mertz, Arab Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 13.
2. Tareq Y. Ismael, The U.A.R. In Africa, p. 3.
3. Donald L. Wiedner, A History of Africa South of the Sahara, pp. 109-112.
4. Ismael, p. 232.
5. Tareq, p. 232.
6. Mertz, p. 27.
7. Mertz, p. 28.
8. Mertz, p. 17.
9. Mertz, p. 30.
10. Mertz, p. 30.
11. Mertz, p. 31.
12. Mertz, p. 31.
13. Frank Wisner, "FY 1986 Assistance Requests for Sub-Saharan Africa," Department of State Bulletin, May 1985, p. 52.
14. Ibid., p. 53.
15. Ibid., p. 54.
16. Ibid., p. 54.
17. Tareq, p. 251.

APPENDICES

1. Map of Africa.
2. Map of Islam in Africa.
3. Aggregate Bilateral Arab Commitments to Different Groups of Recipients: 1973-1980.
4. African Countries Ranked by Amount of Consolidated Arab Bilateral Aid Commitment: 1973-1980.
5. Proposed US Economic and Military Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: Fiscal Year 1986.
6. Major African Recipients of Arab Bilateral Assistance Ranked by Country: 1973-180.

A detailed map of Africa showing country borders, major cities, and geographical features. The map includes labels for countries such as Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Zaire, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Madagascar. Major cities like Algiers, Tripoli, Cairo, Khartoum, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Johannesburg are marked. The map also shows the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean.



Major African Recipients of Bilateral Assistance Ranked by Country:
1973-1980
(\$ Million)

Algeria		Iraq	
1. Gabon (b)	\$ 5	1. Somalia (a b)	95.1
2. Sierra Leone	4	2. Mauritania (a b)	66.8
3. Mali (b)	3.1	3. Sudan (a b)	41
4. Niger (b)	2.4	4. Zambia	39
5. Benin	2.3	5. Madagascar	37.7
6. Upper Volta (b)	1.3	6. Chad (b)	34
7. Guinea Bissau (b)	1.0	7. Tanzania	30.2
8. Togo	0.9	8. Mozambique	20.3
9. Zambia	0.8	9. Guinea (b)	16.5
10. Guinea (b)	0.7	10. Uganda (b)	10.0
11. Mauritania (a b)	0.7		

Kuwait		Libya	
1. Sudan (a b)	613.1	1. Zaire	101.3
2. Mauritania (a b)	179.6	2. Uganda (b)	78.4
3. Somalia (a b)	79.0	3. Guinea (b)	77.8
4. Senegal (b)	65.1	4. Mauritania (a b)	65.7
5. Congo	38.2	5. Gabon (b)	33.5
6. Mali (b)	34.4	6. Chad (b)	21.1
7. Gambia (b)	33.9	7. Somalia (a b)	20.5
8. Tanzania	33.6	8. Niger (b)	20.3
9. Ghana	31.3	9. Mali (b)	9.5
10. Uganda (b)	28.0	10. Cameroon (b)	8.0

Qatar		Saudi Arabia	
1. Somalia (a b)	21.3	1. Sudan (a b)	946.6
2. Sudan (a b)	18.2	2. Mauritania (a b)	476.2
3. Mauritania (a b)	16.7	3. Somalia (a b)	310.1
4. Mali (b)	12.5	4. Djibouti (a b)	70.0
5. Uganda (b)	11.0	5. Zaire	69.2
6. Zaire	4.8	6. Mali (b)	66.8
7. Senegal (b)	4.5	7. Cameroon (b)	51.0
8. Guinea (b)	4.0	8. Senegal (b)	45.8
9. Cameroon (b)	3.0	9. Kenya	45.4
10. Gambia (b)	2.2	10. Guinea (b)	43.3

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1. Sudan (a b)	347.2
2. Somalia (a b)	179.8
3. Mauritania (a b)	81.6
4. Zaire	50.3
5. Uganda (b)	20.7
6. Mali (b)	9.1
7. Guinea-Bissau (b)	6.4
8. Tanzania	6.2
9. Madagascar	4.2
10. Guinea (b)	4.1

**African Countries Ranked by Amount of Consolidated Bilateral Aid
Commitments: 1973-1980¹
(\$ Million)**

Country	Amount	Country	Amount
1. Sudan (a) (b)	\$ 1966.4	24. Togo	22.9
2. Mauritania (a) (b)	887.3	25. Mozambique	21.7
3. Somalia (a) (b)	704.8	26. Rwanda	18.5
4. Uganda (b)	183.3	27. Botswana	18.3
5. Guinea (b)	171.9	28. Burundi	18.1
6. Zaire	166.4	29. Equatorial Guinea	16.2
7. Mali (b)	136.3	30. Lesotho	10.6
8. Senegal (b)	117.8	31. Benin	10.5
9. Zambia	109.8	32. Upper Volta (b)	7.4
10. Madagascar	84.0	33. Mauritius	5.8
11. Cameroon (b)	78.3	34. Cape Verde	4.7
12. Djibouti (a) (b)	77.2	34. Sierra Leone	4.7
13. Gabon (b)	75.8	36. Central African Republic	4.0
14. Chad (b)	75.1	37. Ethiopia	2.2
15. Tanzania	70.0	37. Seychelles	2.2
16. Ghana	63.8	39. Zimbabwe	0.1
17. Niger (b)	62.8	40. Angola	0
18. Congo	58.2	40. Ivory Coast	0
19. Gambia (b)	55.4	40. Malawi	0
20. Comoros (b)	50.8	40. Sao Tome e Principe	0
21. Kenya	45.4	40. Swaziland	0
22. Liberia	30.7		
23. Guinea-Bissau (b)	26.1		

(a) = Member of the Arab League

(b) = Member of the Islamic Conference

¹ = Preliminary data for 1980 only.

AFRICA
PROPOSED FY 86 ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
(\$ MILLION)
MAJOR RECIPIENTS

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>AID</u>	<u>PL 480</u>	<u>ESF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
KENYA	21.7	13.7	35.0	70.4
LIBERIA	15.0	11.0	48.0	74.0
MOZAMBIQUE	2.0	10.0	15.0	27.0
SENEGAL	20.0	10.1	15.0	45.1
SOMALIA	18.5	20.0	35.0	73.5
SUDAN	28.0	50.7	115.0	193.7
ZAIRE	19.5	21.5	15.0	56.0
.....
TOTAL	357.8	224.9	461.5	1,044.2

SOURCE: DEPT OF STATE

AFRICA
PROPOSED FY 86 MILITARY ASSISTANCE
(\$ MILLION)
MAJOR RECIPIENTS

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>IMET</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>FMS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
BOTSWANA	.4	4.0	6.0	10.4
KENYA	1.8	25.0	—	26.8
LIBERIA	1.3	13.0	—	14.3
SOMALIA	1.5	40.0	—	41.5
SUDAN	1.7	58.5	—	60.2
ZAIRE	1.4	10.4	—	11.8
.....
TOTAL	12.6	189.4	18.0	220.0

SOURCE: DEPT OF STATE

Aggregate Bilateral Commitments to Different Groups of Recipients: 1973-1980¹
(\$ Million)

	Arab League States ²		Sub-Saharan Members of the Islamic Conference		Least Developed Countries		Most Seriously Affected Countries		Total Africa	Total Sub-Saharan Africa
	\$	% ³	\$	% ³	\$	% ³	\$	% ³	\$	\$
Algeria	0.7	2.5	14.2	63.4	10.3	46.0	15.7	70.1	28.1	27.4
Iraq	204.0	51.8	61.4	32.5	92.0	48.7	150.0	79.4	394.1	190.1
Kuwait	877.8	63.0	261.8	55.8	242.7	47.2	363.6	77.5	1,392.4	514.6
Libya	86.5	18.5	257.8	67.9	220.8	58.1	238.6	62.8	468.4	381.9
Qatar	56.2	54.7	40.7	87.5	31.7	68.2	40.2	86.5	102.7	46.5
Saudi Arabia	1,801.9	74.7	357.2	58.6	249.1	40.9	403.2	66.2	2,411.1	609.2
United Arab Emirates	608.9	83.4	50.3	43.4	53.0	45.7	61.0	52.6	729.6	121.0
Total	\$ 3,635.7	65.8 %	\$ 1,043.4	57.0 %	\$ 899.6	49.1 %	\$ 1,272.3	69.4 %	\$ 5,526.4	\$ 1,890.7

¹ Partial data for 1980. Includes only information on the commitments of the national funds of Abu Dhabi, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

² Includes Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia and Sudan.

³ As a percent of total aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, except in the case of the Arab League States where the calculation refers to total aid to Africa.

Source: OECD

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